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ANDREvV W. MARTIN, Respondent, v. A. H. HENDEl~
SON, as Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles,
etc., et al., Appellants.
GEORGE H. REDWINE, Respondent, v. A. H. HENDERSON, as Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles,
etc., rt al., Appellants.
[1] Civil Service- Persons Included.- Officers of the highway
patrol are included within civil service ( Const., art XXIV,
§ 4[a]) and come within the definition of the word "employee" for purposes of the State Civil Service Act. (Stats.
1937, ch. 753, § 8, p. 2086; now Gov. Code, § 18526.)
[2] Public Officers-Compensation.-A person accepting a public
office with a fixed salary is bound to perform the duties of
the office for the salary, and he cannot legally claim additional compensation for discharge of these duties, even though
the salary may be a very inadequate remuneration for the
services, and even though subsequent statutes or ordinances
have increased his duties but not his salary.
[3] Labor-Hours of Public Employees.-When a public employee
is paid by time, as by the day, week or month, rather than
by the amount of work which he does, he is bound, in the
absence of statute, to render services without regard to the
number of hours worked.
[ 4] !d.-Hours of Public Employees-Compensation for Overtime.
-In the absence of a statutory provision therefor, time off
granted for work done by a state employee in excess of
reasonable work hours is not granted as of right, but is
allowed in accordance with necessities of the duties to be
performed (former Pol. Code,§ 350; now Gov. Code,§ 11152),
and the fact that normal hours of work are established and
compensating time off is provided for work beyond those
hours does not of itself give the employee a right to payment for overtime.
[5] Civil Service-Statutory Regulation.-The terms and condi·
tions of civil service employment are fixed by statute and
not by contract.
l2] See Cal.Jur., Public Officers, § 106; Am.Jur., Public Officers,
§ :141 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Civil Service, § 3; [2] Public Officers, §106; [3,4] Labor, §4.5; [5,6] Civil Service, §1; [7-11]
Civil Service, § 8; [12] Judgments, § 9(5).
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[6] !d.-Statutory Regulation.-The statutory provisions controlling terms and conditions of civil service employment cannot
be circumvented by purported contracts in conflict therewith.
[7a, 7b] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work.-The enactment of
State Civil Service Act, § 150.5, effective February 6, 1943
(Stats. 1943, ch. 20, § 2, p. 136; now Gov. Code, § 18005),
and the addition of §§ 73, 73.5 to the act, effective June 7,
1943 ( Stats. 1943, ch. 1041, §§ 1, 2, pp. 2976, 2977; now Gov.
Code, §§ 18020-18024), providing a comprehensive system of
overtime computation and compensation, did not 'create a
right to payment for overtime previously worked; the statutes were not, and could not be, retroactive. (Disapproving
language in Howard v. Lampton, 87 Cal.App.2d 449, 457, 459,
197 P.2d 69, implying that Gov. Code, § 18005, may be applied retroactively.)
[8] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work.-Services performed by
highway patrolmen prior to February 6, 1943, the effective
date of State Civil Service Act, § 150.5, were such as they
were bound to render for their fixed monthly salaries, and
under the prohibition of Const., art. IV, § 32, declaring that
the Legislature shall have no power to grant extra compensation or allowance to any public officer under any agreement
made without express authority of law, they could be granted
no extra compensation for such services.
(Disapproving
Howard v. Lampton, 87 Cal.App.2d 449, 197 P.2d 69, and
Clark v. State Personnel Board, 56 Cal.App.2d 499, 133 P.2d
11, insofar as they determine that a state officer or employee,
in absence of specific statutory authority, is entitled to a cash
payment for accrued overtime on separation from service.)
[9] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work-Limitation of Actions.
-Gov. Code, § 19630, declaring that no action shall be brought
for wrongs or grievances based on or related to any state
civil service law unless commenced within one year after
cause of action first arose, is the statute of limitations applicable to salary claims of employees or those who have
been separated from service, and controls the time for bringing any action on a claim for overtime services.
[10] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work-Limitation of Actions.
-In view of State Civil Service Act, § 150.5 (now Gov. Code,
§ 18005}, authorizing payment for previous overtime work
on employee's separation from service without fault on his
part, no cause of action to compel payment of overtime claims
for services performed by highway patrolmen in excess of
their regular hours of duty accrued to them prior to their
separation from service, since until that date they might have
been given compensating time off whenever their departmental
[7] See Cal.Jur., Civil Service, § 6; Am.Jur., Civil Service, § 17.
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sup~:riors

rkemed it convenient to the ;;ervice, and a right to
action by the department would accrue to such patrolmen only in the event uncompensated overtime remained on
their separation from service.
[11] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work-Limitation of Actions.
-The availability of an action for declaratory relief does
not affect the period of limitations commencing on a state
department's breach of its obligation to pay for accumulated
overtime on an employee's separation from the service.
[12] Judgments-Declaratory Judgments-Defenses-Limitations.
-The period of limitations applicable to ordinary actions
at law and suits in equity should be applied in like manner
to actions for declaratory relief.
comp(~l

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County. John Quincy Brown, Judge. Affirmed in
part and reversed in part.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel approval of claims
for overtime work by state employees. Judgment granting
writ reversed insofar as it directs approval of claims in
excess of enumerated amounts; affirmed in all other respects.
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General, and Wilmer W. Morse, Deputy Attorney General, for
Appellants.
James H. Phillips for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.-For a number of years, Andrew \V. Martin was a traffic sergeant and George H. Redwine a traffic
officer of the State Highway Patrol. They worked in excess
of regular hours of duty without receiving equivalent time
off. After the termination of their employment, Martin and
Redwine each filed a petition to compel the appropriate state
official to approve his claim for overtime. The appeal is
from a judgment requiring approval and payment of the
claims.
The facts are undisputed. During the entire period of
service, the monthly salary of each petitioner was fully paid.
Martin worked about 500 hours in excess of his regular hours
of duty, 100 of them being worked between February 6 and
September 29, 1943. Redwine's excess hours of duty totaled
332, all but 33 of them being served before February 6, 1943.
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Martin retired on April 30, 1947.
Redwine's separation
from service was on March 16, 1947.
Headquarters General Order No. 295, issued by the chief
of the highway patrol, effective October 1, 1939, provided:
''Employees ordered to work beyond the hours ordinarily
required or hours overtime in addition to what is considered
their regular full day's work, may be allowed time off on
the day following or at some other convenient time in lieu
of the overtime hours worked. Overtime hours shall be adjusted by the immediate superior of the employee affected
and shall not become a part of the Headquarters' record.''
Order No. 295 was canceled by Headquarters General Order
No. 394 effective August 5, 1942. The new order read: "Employees ordered to work beyond the hours ordinarily required
and considered as a full days work may be allowed compensating time off in lieu of such overtime worked. Such
overtime hours may be granted and adjusted by the immediate superior of the employee affected and shaH not become
a part of the Headquarters record.''
On June 5, 1945, the chief of the highway patrol issued
Information Bulletin No. 323, requiring that any claim for
overtime hours accumulated prior to September 29, 1943,
must be reported to the department in writing, accompanied
by evidence in affidavit form supporting the claim. Failure
to present a claim in the form outlined by June 30 would
constitute a waiver of any claim for such overtime hours.
Each of the petitioners complied with the requirements of
this bulletin by timely filing a claim in the specified form.
Thereafter, on August 21, 1945, Headquarters Information
Bulletin No. 329 was issued rejecting each and all of the
claims presented pursuant to Bulletin No. 323. Following
a list of reasons for the rejection of the claims, Bulletin No.
329 stated that ''it is not believed that the State is privileged
at this time either to grant compensating time off for overtime hours . . . worked prior to September 29, 1943, or to
pay an employee the cash equivalent thereof on separation
or otherwise. Accordingly, liability therefor is hereby denied
and no such overtime credit will be recognized . . . and any
and all overtime hours . . . accumulated or claimed to have
been accumulated prior to September 29, 1943, are hereby
eancelled. ''
Rule 12 of the State Personnel Board, adopted June 17,
1938, with reference to the pay plan for the state civil service
provided for pay schedules. Section 2 (c) of the rule stated
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that: "The rates of pay set forth in the pay schedules, unless otherwise indicated in such schedules, represent the total
compensation in every form." It was also provided in section 2 (h) that: "When the rate of pay is in terms of dollars a month no additional payment for overtime shall be
made to any employee for services rendered by him in the
same department, whether in the discharge of his ordinary
duties or for any other duties which may be imposed upon
him or which he may undertake or volunteer to discharge
or perform." On October 18, 1940, section 2 (h) of rule
12 was amended to read : ''When the rate of pay is in terms
of dollars a months no additional payment for overtime shall
be made to any employee for services rendered by him m
the same classification in the same department.''
Effective February 6, 1943, section 150.5 was added to
the State Civil Service Act (Stats. 1937, ch. 753) providing:
"Upon a separation from service, without fault on his part,
a person shall be entitled to a lump sum payment as of the
time of separation . . . for any time off to which the person
is entitled by reason of previous overtime work where compensating time off for overtime work is provided for by the
appointing power or by the rules of the board. Such sums
shall be computed by projecting the accumulated time on
a calendar basis so that the lump sum will equal the amount
to which the employee would have been paid had he taken
the time off but not separated from the service." (Stats.
1943, ch. 20, § 2, p. 136; now Gov. Code, § 18005.)
The petition of Rerlwine, filed March 11, 1948, asked that
the respondent state officers be required to approve and pay
his claim for overtime on the basis of the amount of salary
he was receiving at the time he left the , state service. By
petition filed on April 21, 1948, Martin sought the same
relief. The answer of the respondents denied that any amount
was due for overtime. They alleged that any accumulated
ovPrtime hours had been canceled hy departmental action
and that the causes of action are barred by various statutory
provisions.
Upon trial the superior court, by writ of mandate, directed
that the respondents approve Martin's claim in the amount
of $872.95 and Redwine's for $512.44, the respective cash
values of the claimed overtime. The appeal is from that
judgment.
In support of their appeal, the respondents contend that,
insofar as hours worked prior to February 6, 1943, are con-
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cerned, Martin and Redwine were paid monthly salaries
which, by statute, constituted compensation in full for all
services which might be rendered by them. Prior to that
date, they say, there was no statutory provision for overtime
compensation and none could be allowed in the absence of
statute. The respondents also argue that the claims are
barred by the statute of limitations, regardless of whether
the hours were worked prior or subsequent to February 6,
1943. Even if Martin and Redwine are entitled to a cash
payment for overtime worked prior to February 6, 1943,
the respondents say, the amount should be computed upon
the basis of each officer's salary as of the time the hours were
worked, rather than as of the time of separation.
Martin and Redwine rely upon Howard v. Lampton, 87
Cal.App.2d 449 [197 P.2d 69], and Clark v. State Personnel
Board, 56 Cal.App.2d 499 [133 P.2d 11]. These decisions
were based, by analogy, upon Pohle v. Christian, 21 Cal.2d
83 [130 P.2d 417], in which it was held that a civil service
employee, upon separation from service without fault on his
part, is entitled to a cash payment for accumulated vacation
time. The basis for the conclusion in the Pohle case was the
statutory provision giving each officer and employee of the
state a right to a vacation of specified, duration. (Former
Pol. Code, § 359c; cf. Gov. Code, § 18050.) In accordance
with former seCtion 359d of the Political Code (now Gov.
Code, § 18052), the State Personnel Board had provided for
payment upon separation for unused portions of vacation
time. (State Personnel Board Rule 13, § 4.) The court
held that, because the applicable sections of the Political Code
''do not expressly or otherwise provide that an employee
having the right to a vacation loses his right to compensation for that time upon being separated from the service''
he is entitled to payment for unused vacation time. (P. 90.)
The Clark case followed the Pohle decision insofar as payment for accumulated vacation time was concerned. The
court then held that, despite the absence of any statutory
provision granting time off for overtime work and a rule
of the Personnel Board specifically prohibiting payment for
overtime, a state employee may be paid upon separation from
service for accumulated overtime hours. It said: "We see
no difference in principle between allowing an employee a
cash payment for accrued vacation time upon his separation
from the service, and allowing him, upon such separation,
a cash payment in lieu of the compensatory time off to which
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he may have become entitled because of overtime worked.''
The rule regarding payment for overtime hours expressed in
the Clark case was applied to retired officers of the highway
patrol in the Howard case, which involved a factual situation
substantially similar to that here presented.
The basic fallacy in the Howard and Clark cases was the
court's assumption that, in the absence of any statutory
provision, a civil service employee had a right to compensatory time off for overtime work. Those decisions are clearly
distinguishable from the Pohle case, where the employee had
a right granted by statute to a specified amount of vacation
time.
Prior to February 6, 1943, the effective date of section
150.5 of the State Civil Service Act, supra, there was no
statutory provision for overtime compensation. Section 1033
of the Political Code (now Gov. Code, § 18000) provided:
''The salaries fixed by law for all state officers, elective or
appointive, shall be compensation in full for all services rendered in any official capacity or employment whatsoever, during their terms of office, and no such officer shall receive for
his own use any fee or perquisite for the performance of
any official duty." The same limitation was applied to civil
service employees by the State Personnel Board (State Personnel Board Rule 12, § 2 [c], sttpra) acting under its power
to "establish and adjust salary ranges." ( Stats. 1937, ch.
753, § 70, p. 2094; now Gov. Code, § 18850.) Implementing
this limitation, the board also specifically prohibited additional payment to any employee for overtime. (State Personnel Board Rule 12, § 2 [h J, supra.) [1] Officers of the
hig·hway patrol are included within civil service ( Const., art.
XXIV, § 4[a]) and come within the definition of the word
''employee'' for the purposes of the State Civil Service Act.
(Stats. 1937, ch. 753, § 8, p. 2086; now Gov. Code, § 18526.)
[2] The statutory and regulatory limitations upon compensation for services are but a codification and application
to civil servants of the oft-repeated rule "that a person accepting a public office with a fixed salary is bound to perform the duties of the office for the salary. He cannot legally
claim additional compensation for the discharge of these
duties, even though the salary may be a very inadequate
remuneration for the services, nor does it alter the case that
by subsequent statutes or ordinances his duties are increased,
and not his salary. His undertaking is to perform the duties
of his office, whatever they may be, from time to time during
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his continuance in office for the compensation stipulated,
whether these duties are diminished or increased; and whenever he considers the compensation inadequate he is at liberty to resign." (Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 601, 629 [28
P. 834, 29 P. 1092, 16 L.R.A. 161] ; Buck v. City of Eureka,
109 Cal. 504, 517 [42 P. 243, 30 L.R.A. 409]; McAuliffe v.
Kane, 54 Cal.App.2d 288, 296 [128 P.2d 932] ; Vogel v.
White, 134 Cal.App. 252, 254 [25 P.2d 233]; Kilroy v. Whitmore, 115 Cal.App. 43, 49 [300 P. 851].)
[3] 'l'he rule applies not only to the duties themselves, as
in the cases cited, but also to the hours of work. When the
employee is paid by time, as by the day, week, or month,
rather than by the amount of work which he does, he is
bound, in the absence of statute, to render services without
regard to the number of hours worked. (Robinson v. Dunn,
77 Cal. 473 [19 P. 878, 11 Am.St.Rep. 297].) Thus, in this
case, Martin and Redwine, being paid by the month, could
be required to work whatever number of hours each month
was necessary for the performance of their duties. The situation is in no way analogous to that in the Pohle case where
the vacation was a matter of statutory right. The vacation
was a period of time when no services could be required although compensation continued to be payable.
Obviously, efficient management and satisfactory employment relations require the state to :fix reasonable work hours.
[4] In the absence of a statutory provision therefor, time
off granted for work done in excess of those hours is not
given as of right, but is allowed in accordance with the
necessities of the duties to be performed. (Former Pol. Code,
§ 350; now Gov. Code, § 11152; cf. Stats. 1937, ch. 753, § 154,
p. 2103 ; now Gov. Code, § 18705.) The fact that normal hours
of work are established and compensating time off is provided for work beyond those hours does not, of itself, give
the employee a right to payment for overtime.
[5] "The terms and conditions of civil service employment are :fixed by statute and not by contract. (Citations.)
'When an employee of the state, under civil service, accepts
a position, he does so with knowledge of the fact that his
salary, and, indeed, his conduct, are both subject to the law
governing such matters, as set forth in the statute and
the rules and regulations of the commission.' (Citations.)
[6] The statutory provisions controlling the terms and conditions of civil service employment cannot be circumvented
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by purported contracts in conflict therewith." (Boren v. State
Personnel Board, 37 Cal.2d 634, 641 [234 P.2d 981] .)
[7a] The enactment of section 150.5 of the State Civil
Service Act and the addition of sections 73 and 73.5 to the
act, effective June 7, 1943 (Stats. 1943, ch. 1041, §§ 1-2, pp.
2976-2977; now Gov. Code, §§ 18020-18024), providing a comprehensive system of overtime computation and compensation,
did not create a right to payment for overtime previously
worked. The statutes were not, and could not be, retroactive.
''The Legislature shall have no power to grant, . . . any
extra compensation or allowance to any public officer, agent,
servant, or contractor, after service has been rendered, . . .
in whole or in part, nor to pay, or to authorized the payment
of, any claim hereafter created against the State, . . . under
any agreement or contract made without express authority
of law; and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts
shall be null and void.'' ( Const., art. IV, § 32.) [8] The
services performed by Martin and Redwine prior to February
6, 1943, were such as they were bound to render for their
fixed monthly salaries. Under the prohibition of the Constitution, they could be granted no extra compensation for
such services. (Robinson v. Dunn, supra, p. 475.)
Insofar as Howard v. Lampton, supra, and Clark v. State
Personnel Board, supra, determine that a state officer or employee, in the absence of specific statutory authority, is entitled to a cash payment for accrued overtime upon separation from service, they are disapproved. [7b] Also disapproved is language in Howard v. Lampton, supra, pp. 457, 459,
implying that section 18005 of the Government Code may
be applied retroactively.
The respondents do not contend that payment could not
be allowed for hours worked in excess of normal subsequent
to February 6, 1943, the effective date of section 150.5. However, they argue that the claims of Martin and Redwine are
barred in their entirety by the statute of limitations, regardless of whether the hours were worked prior or subsequent
to that date. Because there was no right to payment for
overtime worked prior to February 6, 1943, this contention
will be considered only in relation to hours worked after
that date.
[9] Section 19630 of the Government Code, as here material, provides: "No action or proceeding shall be brought
by any person having or claiming to have a cause of action
or complaint or ground for issuance of any complaint or
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legal remedy for wrongs or grievances based on or related
to any civil service law in this State or the administration
thereof unless such action or proceeding is commenced and
served within one year after such cause of action or complaint or ground for issuance of any writ or legal remedy
first arose.'' This is the statute of limitations applicable to
salary claims of employees or those who have been separated
from service (Philbrick v. State Personnel Board, 53 Cal.
App.2d 222, 230 [127 P.2d 634]) and controls the time for
bringing any action upon a claim for overtime services.
(Broyles v. State Personnel Board, 42 Cal.App.2d 303, 307
[108 P.2d 714].)
It is conceded that each of these proceedings was commenced within one year after the date of the petitioner's separation from service. Relying upon Dillon v. Board of Pension Cornmrs., 18 Cal.2d 427 [116 P.2d 37, 136 A.L.R. 800L
the respondents contend that the statute commenced to run
upon August 21, 1945, when the department rejected all
claims for accumulated overtime. Martin and Redwine argue
that this contention was concluded by Howard v. Lampton,
supra, pp. 456-457, which held that the statute did not start
to run until the date of separation from service.
In the Dillon case, the question before the court was
whether the period of limitation upon the right to claim a
widow's pension commenced to run at the death of the husband or was to be measured from the date each payment of
the pension would have become due. Holding that the date
of death was decisive, the court said: ''A cause of action
accrues when a suit may be maintained thereon, and the
£tatute of limitations therefore begins to run at that time.
(Citations.) The cause of action to establish the right to
a pension accrued to plaintiff at the time of her husband's
death. At any time following the death she could demand
a pension from the board and upon refusal could maintain
a suit to enforce such action." (P. 430.)
[10] No cause of action to compel the payment of overtime claims accrued to Martin and Redwine prior to their
separation from service. Until that date, they might have
been given compensating time off whenever their departmental superiors deemed it convenient to the service. The
petitioners had no legal remedy to compel their superiors
to give them time off at any specific time, or at all. Only
in the event uncompensated overtime remained upon their

Apr.1953]

MARTIN

v.

HENDERSON

593

[40 C.2d 583; 255 P.2d 416]

separation from service did a right accrue to them to compel
action by the department.
The respondents argue, however, that upon the department's denial of credits for accumulated overtime a cause
of action accrued, ''not to compel compensating time off or
the cash equivalent of time off, but to establish status as a
person having compensable overtime to his credit usable if,
as and when compensating time off could be granted.'' In
essence, this position is that the petitioners had a cause of
action to establish their right to compensation for overtime
even if there was no remedy to enforce such right. Although
no specific reference is made to it, the respondents apparently
suggest that there might be an action for declaratory relief.
[11] However, the availability of such an action would
in no way affect the period of limitations commencing upon
the department's breach of its obligation to pay for accumulated overtime. [12] As stated in Maguire v. Hibernia Sav.
& L. Soc., 23 Cal.2d 719 [146 P.2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 1062), "the
period of limitations applicable to ordinary actions at law
and suits in equity should be applied in like manner to
actions for declaratory relief. Thus, if declaratory relief is
sought with reference to an obligation which has been breached
and the right to commence an action for 'coercive' relief
upon the cause of action arising therefrom is barred by the
statute, the right to declaratory relief is likewise barred.
On the other hand, if declaratory relief is sought 'before there
has been a breach of the obligation in respect to which said
declaration is sought,' or within the statutory period after
the breach, the right to such relief is not barred by lapse of
time. (Citations.) There is no anomaly in the fact that
a party may have a right to sue for declaratory relief without setting in motion the statute of limitations. Quiet title
actions, forerunners of declaratory actions, may be maintained when an adverse claim to property is asserted, but
the period of limitations does not commence to run at that
elate." (P. 734.)
The amounts to which Martin and Redwine are entitled
are to be computed by ''projecting the accumulated time
on a calendar basis so that the lump sum will equal the
amount which [they 1 would have been paid had [they]
taken the time off but not separated from the service.'' (Gov.
Code, § 18005.) At the time of his separation from service,
Martin's salary amounted to $340 per month, or $1.70 per
hour based upon a 48-hour week. Subsequent to February 6,
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1943, he accumulated 100% overtime hours, or a sum equal
to $170.85. Redwine's salary at the time of his separation
from service was $310 per month, or $1.54 per hour. For
the 33 hours of accumulated overtime for which he legally
may claim compensation, he is entitled to $50.82.
Insofar as the judgment directs the state officials to approve the petitioners' claims in excess of these enumerated
amounts, the judgment is reversed. In all other respects,
it is affirmed, each party to pay his own costs on appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
These cases were correctly decided by the District Court of
AppE'al, Third Distriet (see Martin v. Lampton, (Cal.App.)
240 P.2d 21) and I adopt the views there expressed. However, I desire to eomment on the position taken by the majority
here.
The record discloses that the state employees here involved
worked overtime at the express command of their superiors
with the promise of time off for the overtime, yet the majority denies them compensation therefor on the grounds that
there is no statutory authority for the payment of such overtime or promise to pay it, and that as to their claim for overtime since the enactment of section 150.5 of the State Civil
Serviee Act (Stats. 1937, ch. 753) in 1943 expressly providing for overtime pay, it is barred by the statute of limitation.
The overtime pay here claimed must be allowed under
Pohle v. Chr·istian, 21 Cal.2d 83 [130 P.2d 417]. In that case
plaintiff sought to recover a lump sum for accumulated
vaeation pay after he was separated from his position. It
was held that he was entitled to pay for the vacation accumulated prior to his severanee on the ground that sections 359c
and 359d of the Political Code then authorized vacations and
the accumulation of vacation time. It made no provision,
hoVJever, for· payment o.f accumulated vacation time after
separation from serv'ice, where the vacation was not taken
prior to separation. That case has since been followed. (Clark
v. State Personnel Board, 56 Cal.App.2d 499 [133 P.2d 11];
Ven·y v. Eckel, 61 Cal.App.2d 595 [143 P.2d 394].) The
majority seeks to escape the effect of that case by asserting
that at common law there is no right to recover for overtime
when a person is hired by the month, and there is no statute
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authorizing payment for overtime as there was authorizing a
vacation in the Pohle case. Tn that reasoning the majority is
in error. The statutes in foree at the time the overtime service was rendered provided : ''Eight hours of labor constitutes a day's work, unless it is otherwise expressly stipulated
by the parties to a contract." (Lab. Code, § 510.) "Eight
hours labor constitutes a legal day's work in all cases where
the same is performed under the authority of any law of this
State, or under the direction, or control, or by the authority
of any officer of this State acting in his official capacity, or
nnder the direction, or control or by the authority of any
municipal corporation, or of any officer thereof." (Lab. Code,
§ 1810.) ''Every person employed in any occupation of labor
is entitled to one day's rest therefrom in seven." (Lab. Code,
§ 551.) "No employer of labor shall cause his employees to
work more than six days in seven.'' (Lab. Code, § 552.) While
those provisions do not expressly state that they apply to the
state as an employer, there is no reason why they should not
inasmuch as they are not in derogation of the state's sovereignty and there is no reason why we should suppose that the
I..egislature intended to require private employers to treat
their employees in a more favorable manner than its own employees. There is, therefore, statutory authority which :fixes
the hours of labor like that in the Pohle case which authorizes
a vacation and an accumulation thereof for which pay may be
recovered on separation from service. From such authority
it follows that work beyond those hours is overtime and compensation therefor should be paid the same as in the Pohle
ease where it was held that from the establishment of the
right to a vacation and to accumulate it, a right to be paid for
the vacation when not taken ensued. Moreover, it should
be noted that the heads of departments of the state "may
arrange and classify the work of the department'' and adopt
rules and regulations "necessary to govern the activities of
the department" and may "assign" to its "employees such
duties as it sees fit." (Gov. Code, § 11152.) Having that
authority it could, as it did, require employees to work overtime and make a valid promise to give time off in lieu thereof.
Having failed to give the time off before the separation of the
employee from service, like an untaken vacation in the Pohle
ease, it is proper to award the employee money for the withheld time off as was done for untaken vacation time in the
Pohle case. It is clear, therefore, that there was statutory
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authority for agreeing to give time off for overtime, and in
lieu thereof compensation, and the Pohle case is controlling.
In addition, however, the state is estopped to assert that
the department of motor vehicles through the chief of the
highway patrol did not have authority to promise time off
for overtime. The case of Boren v. State Personnel Board,
37 Cal.2d 634 [234 P.2d 981], is clearly distinguishable. In
the Boren case there was positive statutory authority to transfer an employee from one part of the state to another (here
we have no positive statutory provision that there shall be
no pay for overtime ; the statutes are to the contrary) and there
was no showing in that case of unjust enrichment by the state
at the expense of the employee as we have here. Here the
employee was promised time off to compensate for overtime.
In reliance thereon he gave extra time to the state. If the
state may take that extra labor without paying for it as the
majority holds, the state is being unjustly enriched at the
expense of the employee. We have, therefore, a clear case of
estoppel. There are many cases where estoppel may run
against the government. (See cases cited, Farrell v. County
of Placer, 23 Cal.2d 624, 628 [145 P.2d 570, 153 .A.L.R. 323] .)
.A few instances may be pointed out in which the justice of
invoking estoppel is present as much or even less than here.
In Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Cou1·t, 3 Cal.2d 309 [44 P.2d
547], the city of Los .Angeles was held estopped to abandon
eminent domain proceedings where, in reliance thereon, defendant property owner had acquired other property and constructed a building thereon. It was there said ( p. 330), "If
the city had expressly agreed by its officers with defendants'
grantors, even in parol, that a certain line should constitute
the boundary line between the street and the grantor's property, and upon the faith of such agreement the grantors had
erected a block of buildings flush with the line of the street
as agreed upon by all parties, it would be a hard law that
would allow the city to repudiate that agreement, and destroy
the grantor's property. No court should countenance such a
thing, and an estoppel in pais will rise up in the pathway of
a city to bar it and its principal, the people, from the commission of such a grievous wrong ; and to give the acts of this
city a very limited meaning we · think its conduct in the
present case at least equivalent to an oral agreement as to
the location of the true boundary line of the street." (To the
same effect, see McGee v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 390
[57 P.2d 925] .) In City of Los Angeles v. Cohn, 101 Cal.
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373 [35 P. 1002], the city was estopped to claim property
which it owned but said it did not and in reliance thereon
the person who had. been in possession thereof built a building on it. The same situation, except it was a canal through
a city, was involved in Fresno v. Fresno C. &; I. Co., 98 Cal.
179 [32 P. 943]. Land claimed by the city as streets was
considered in Sacramento v. Olunie 120 Cal. 29 [52 P. 44).
In City of Los Angeles v. Oo1mty of Los Angeles, 9 Cal.2d
624 [72 P.2d 138, 113 A.L.R. 370], a county was held estopped
to collect from a railroad company additional payments for
use of its land when it had been accepting certain payments
for 15 years. In Contra Costa Water Go. v. Breed, 139 Cal.
432 [73 P. 189], the city was held liable for water it received and was estopped to deny liability on the claim that
its ordinance providing for payment was invalid. In Tyra v.
Board of Police etc. Oommrs., 32 Cal.2d 666 [197 P.2d 710],
it was held that the city was estopped to plead the statute of
limitation in an action by an employee for a pension where the
pension commissioners had erroneously told him he could not
receive a pension while he was receiving workmen's compensation. Baird v. City of Fresno, 97 Cal.App.2d 336 [217 P.2d
681], is particularly applicable. It was there held that the city
was estopped, when a pension was claimed, to rely on the
invalidity of its determination made many years before that
its employees should be credited with 9 years of service with
the city. Mention is made in some of these cases that where
there is general power authorizing action by a governmental
body in a particular field, the government may be estopped
to assert irregularity in the exercise of that power. Here
we have the general power in the department (Gov. Code,
§ 11152, supra) and it has been so recognized by this court
(Nelson v. Dean, 27 Cal.2d 873 [168 P.2d 16, 168 A.L.R. 467] ).
None of the foregoing authorities presents a clearer case for
estoppel than the case at bar.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-! would affirm the judgment.
It is fundamental in California that before a trial court's
judgment will be reversed on appeal the appellant must show
that there has been error of law resulting in a miscarriage
of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%.) I do not find
such showing here.
There is no suggestion of fraud or overreaching on the
part of either petitioner. Each faithfully discharged the
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duties assigned to him and each during the periods of time
involved worked many hours in excess of his regular hours
of duty. Thus, during the years 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, and
1943, Mr. Redwine worked a total of 370.75 overtime hours
and was allowed 38 hours compensating time off, leaving a
net balance of 332.75 compensating hours off due him. During 1941, 1942, and 1943, Mr. Martin performed a total of
568.5 hours of overtime work and was allowed 32.5 hours
of compensating time off, leaving a balance due him of 536
compensating time off hours.
During the period when the overtime balance was accruing there appears to have been outstanding a ''Headquarters
General Order" providing either that (Headquarters General
Order No. 295) "Employees ordered to work beyond the
hours ordinarily required or hours overtime in addition to
what is considered their regular full day's work, may be
allowed time off on the day following or at some other convenient time in lieu of the overtime hours worked,'' or that
(Headquarters General Order No. 394) "Employees ordered
to work beyond the hours ordinarily required and considered
as a full days work may be allowed compensating time off
in lieu of such overtime worked.' ' 1
It thus appears that employes in the position of petitioners
here were entitled to compensating time off to balance their
overtime, such compensating time off to be allowed at the
convenience of the employe's superior officer. Although (prior
to February 6, 1943) there was no statute providing for cash
payment in settlement for overtime worked it is quite apparent that the state did expect to balance its accounts with
employes for overtime services by allowing an equivalent
amount of compensating time off. If the petitioners here
had rE'mained in the state service indefinitely and had eventually, at the convenience of their superiors, been allowed the
full amount of their overtime as compensating time off I
think that neither this litigation nor any based on such allowance would ever have arisen.
'Headquarters General Order No. 295 was dated September 28, 1939,
by itR terms became effective October 1, 1939, and superseded Headquarters General Order No. 243, issued July 23, 1936. Headquarters
Gener~l Order No. 394 was dated August 5, 1942, and superseded No.
:l!Hi. 'rhe substance of Headquarters General Order No. 243 is not shown
here (it does appear in the companion case of Jarvi.q v. Henderson, post,
p. 600 [255 P.2d 426]) but there is no contention that it differed
materially from Nos. 295 and 394 in respect to the allowance of compensating time off for overtime worked.
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However, apparently in recognition of the fact that employes who had accumulated substantial amounts of overtime credits might not be able to remain in their employment
long enough to >York out a balancing of the account on a compensating time off basis and that there might be a serious
question as to the right of the employe to assert, or the
state to pay in cash, claims for the value of the overtime which
might remain uncompensated upon a separation from service,
1he State Civil Service Act was amended to cover the situation.
Effective Pebruary 6, 1943, section 150.5 was added. It provides (Stats. 1!)43, ch. 20, § 2, p. 136; now Gov. Code, § 18005) :
''Upon separation from service without fault on his part, a
person is entitled to a lump sum payment as of the time
of separation for any unused or accumulated vacation or for
any time off to which he is entitled by reason of previous overtime work where compensating time off for overtime work is
provided for by the appointing power or by rules of the State
Prrsounel Board.
''Such sum shall be computed by projecting the accumulated time on a calendar basis so that the lump sum will
equal the amount which the employee would have been paid
had he taken the time off but not separated from the service.
Persons separated from service through fault of their own are
entitled to a lump sum payment for such compensating time
off for overtime vvork, similarly computed, and in addition,
such portion, if any, of unused vacation as the State Personnel Board may determine. ''
I see no valid objection to applying such section to the
petitioners here. Their service extended beyond the effective
elate of the quoted statute. Up to and at the time of their
separation, the trial court was justified in concluding, they
had a right to compensating time off. The state could settle
that account with them either by permitting them to continue
in employment at the prevailing current wage until they had
been given compensating time off to fully balance their acemnulated overtime or, by virtue of the quoted statute, which
we must presume the Legislature found good reason for enacting, it could settle by the "lump sum payment." That the
''lump sum payment'' was more desirable to the state than
having the employe continue on the payroll, occupying a
position but on a time off basis until his accumulated overtime was fully offset, is readily understandable. The state
may well have needed to fill the position with a person who
would be immediately available for work. Upon separation
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from the Rerviee without fault on their part the petitioners,
by virtue of the statute, became entitled to the "lump sum
payment.'' This is no gift of public money; it does not present
petitioners with anything of value which they have not
earned; it is merely an alternative method of settling a current account which the state has found to be advantageous to it.
Much that is said in my dissent in Treu v. Kirkwood, *(Cal.)
255 P.2d 409, is equally applicable here.
Since no error of law resulting in miscarriage of justice is
shown the judgment should be affirmed.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied April 30,
1953. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.
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L. J. JARVIS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. A. H. HENDERSON, as Director of the Department of Motor V chicles,
etc., et al., Respondents and Appellants.
[1] Civil Service- Statutory Authorization.- A state highway
patrol officer's appointment was not contractual, based on the
assumption that he was appointed in 1931 by the board of
supervisors of his county pursuant to California Vehicle Act
of 1923, § 30 (Stats, 1923, ch. 266, p. 520), where, prior to
his appointment, the statute had been amended to provide
for appointment of traffic officers by the chief of the patrol
with salaries fixed by the director of public works and to
bring all appointees within civil service status (Stats. 1929,
ch. 308, pp. 617-619), and the amendment eliminated the prior
provision for appointment by contract between the chief of
the division and the board of supervisors.
[2] Id.-Compensation.-The salary of a civil service employee
is fixed by statute and rule of the State Personnel Board,
and may not be altered by contract.
[3] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work.-In the absence of a
statute specifically authorizing compensation to a civil serv[2] See Cal.Jur., Civil Service, § 6; Am.Jur., Civil Service, § 17.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Civil Service, § 1; [2, 3, 6, 7] Civil
Service, § 8; [ 4, 5] Labor, § 4.5.
*A rehearing was granted by the Supreme Court on May 1, 1953.

